This research studies private television in Palestine, focusing on the circumstances under which private television industry was established, the nature of the stations, the regulatory system, its relation with the Palestinian National Authority, the role of private television in forming the national and cultural identities for the Palestinians and the problems these stations are facing. In my discussion, I try to draw theoretical accounts of alternative media and media regulations in addition to media and the national and cultural identities. Finally, I conclude my study with a personal evaluation and recommendations.

 Acknowledgments

This study would have not seen light without the support and help of several people. My wife Benaz and daughter Tamar who helped to create an atmosphere that allowed me to finish my studies. Thanks also must go to different people; Mr. Bill Osgereby, my personal tutor at Leicester University in the UK who was supportive of the topic and helped me throughout the entire work, Alison Whitehead and Zahira Ahmad course secretaries at the University for their endless help.

Thanks also go to all interviewees and staff at the different private television stations in Palestine who devoted their time to help me. Special thanks to Mr. Hani Al-Masri, the Director General of the Publications Department at the Palestinian Ministry of Information and Mr. Daoud Kuttab, Director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al-Quds University, both for their continuous support and help.

Introduction

Chapter 1

Background to Development of Television in Palestine

Chapter 2

Reality of Private Television in Palestine

2:1 Structures of Private Television Stations

2:2 Legal and Regularity Framework of Private Television Stations

3:3 The Palestinian National Authority and Private Television Stations

Chapter 3

Private Television and the Palestinian National and Cultural Identities

Chapter 4

Private Television: Professional Practice

Conclusion

Information Update

References

Palestinians have for a long time been the subject of news having little to say in how their image is shaped by the western media. During the first Palestinian uprising Intifada (1987 – 1993) and after the peace process, Palestinians have had the opportunity to begin influencing how the world views them (Institute of Modern Media, 1997).

Throughout the long years of occupation, Palestinians have had few sources of information, especially in the field of television. Few television channels were broadcasting to the Palestinian Occupied Territories. “Palestinians mainly watched Jordanian or Israeli TV, but homes in Northern Palestine could also receive Syrian and Lebanese TV, while those in the South received TV broadcast from Egypt” (Kuttab, 1993).

The signing of the Oslo Agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Government of Israel in 1993, gave a great opportunity for Palestinian electronic media, especially when the Voice of Palestine and Palestine TV were established under the name of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC). The PBC was the first Palestinian broadcasting since 1967 inside Palestine.

The need for an alternative to PBC, and to non-Palestinian television stations, brought the idea of the establishment of private local television stations in Palestine. The Palestinian Ministry of Information did not object to the idea and therefore has put some regulations in order to organize the work of private television. As a result there are 31 private television stations now in Palestine. These stations are located in the six main cities of the West Bank. Only one TV Company in Gaza has recently obtained a license for a television station, but still not broadcasting for technical reasons.

Theoretically, and in regards to alternative media, I will try to link between the case of private television in Palestinian and the theoretical aspects of alternative media.

In my research I study the phenomena of private television in Palestine and take a thorough look at how they function, how they are being regulated and whether private television in Palestine helps to shape the cultural and national political identity of its audiences. This discussion will be theoretically supported.

In the first chapter, I give a general background on the development of television in Palestine, looking at the roots of television, and the absence of Palestinian broadcasting during the years of occupation until the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in Washington in 1993.

In the second chapter I focus on the development of private television in Palestine, its structures, legal and regularity framework. Also I discuss the relationship between private television stations and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Assisted by theories on media regulation, I try to explain the importance of television regulation in the Palestinian case.

Chapter 3 is focused on the role of private television stations in forming the Palestinian national and cultural identities, supported by theories related to media and the national and cultural identity. In chapter 4, I focus on the actual professional practice of private television stations. And the conclusion contains my personal view and possible recommendations.

This research was completed in March 2001 and since it is the first study of its kind, I was, and throughout the entire work, depending on different sources of information. The different newspaper clips and articles helped me get an idea of what is being said about private television in Palestine specially since September 29, 2000 when the second Palestinian uprising (al-Aqsa Intifada) erupted. A great assistance were the relevant theories related to the subjects of alternative media, cultural and national identities, media regulations and others.

A great deal of this work was actually dependent on oral history taken from people who are well informed about the nature of private television in Palestine, and with others who are involved in working at and/or owning private television stations. One-on-one Interview is an effective approach of media research. It provides “detailed and accurate responses on sensitive issues” (Wimmer and Dominick, 1997). It is also personal and allows human interaction. Interview as an approach of media research has its disadvantages. It is done with a nonrandom sample, answers may vary from one person to another, it may be subjected to the interviewer’s/interviewee’s bias and may present problems in data analysis (Wimmer and Dominick, 1997). In this study, interview was of a great help as a method of research, especially for the personal communication, and the ability to meet people who are practically involved. In addition, it helped me find information that was unavailable. May be one disadvantage of interview in my case was the continuous rescheduling of interviews due to other activities the interviewee or myself had to do. Interviews were interrupted by others who had to come into the rooms, especially because the interviewees are top people at their institutions.

Background readings and literature were very helpful; especially those related to the political, social and economical factors that helped establish television in Palestine. Description of the wide range background readings appears in the ‘references’ section at the end of this dissertation.

One other approach I used is a simple questionnaire, to give me an overview of what is in common between private televisions stations in Palestine and in what ways they differ. The purpose of using a questionnaire was to get descriptive information (Wimmer and Dominick, 1997). The advantages behind using this method of media research was because it described the realities at these stations in brief information, which helped me judge the professional level of the stations. Analysis of the questionnaire is widely being used in Chapter 2. Another advantage is the low cost of using a questionnaire specially because I could not visit some stations, but used the fax and e-mail to communicate. Despite all these advantages, I found it difficult to get accurate information, especially with issues related to employment and income. Another disadvantage was that some stations did not cooperate with me at all.

The other method I used is observation. Watching some of the programs shown by private television in my district and comparing it to what the governmental television shows gave me an opportunity to look at similarities and differences. I also visited a number of stations in the district where I live and in other districts, in addition to attending some meetings between stations and the Palestinian Ministry of Information. My observation was for a long period, since I am always interested in what these stations show, but for academic considerations, my focused observation was for a period of three months beginning of October 2000 until the end of December 2000. This period has witnessed an active role for television in Palestine specially in covering the Palestinian – Israeli conflict. Some people see this role as very constructive, but others looked at it in a different view. The advantage of using this method is that some of the problems of private televisions in Palestine cannot be identified using any other method (Wimmer and Dominick, 1997). Especially those issues related to the ethics of journalism, violent bloody scenes and the objective, balanced and accurate coverage of events. Disadvantages of this approach were in being limited to watch three television stations in my district and not being able to watch other stations for technical reasons related to picking up transmission of other stations. Observation in a situation of war is hard to judge objectivity and balance especially when dealing with the killing of ones own people. The last disadvantage was that I had to spend hours watching bloody scenes, dead bodies and low quality material.

Overall, despite the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches I used, this study has helped me realize how important is the documentation of this Palestinian experience. I hope that my study will be useful for others who are interested in this topic.

Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were able to establish their own television only after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in Washington on September 13^th, 1993 by Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. According to the DOP, Israeli Occupation troops were redeployed from the Palestinian cities, and the newly developed Palestinian National Authority (PNA) took control of the major cities in the West Bank and Gaza.

Over almost three decades, the Israeli Occupation controlled all aspects of Palestinian life, including the media. The Palestinian media during Israeli Occupation was restricted. No television or radio stations were allowed to function, and no licenses were granted. “Only three Palestinian newspapers published in East Jerusalem were circulated in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (UNICEF, 1999). These newspapers were censored by the Israeli military censors. Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (O.T.) at that time had no chance to establish their own television for political reasons and restrictions imposed by Occupation authorities. Instead they were introduced to the Arabic service provided by Israeli TV and to government owned television stations in neighboring Arab counties. “Palestinians mainly watched Jordanian or Israeli TV, but homes in Northern Palestine [could] also receive Syrian and Lebanese TV, while those in the South received TV broadcast from Egypt” (Kuttab, 1993).

Grassroots for television production, according Daoud Kuttab in Channels of Resistance 1993, began during the first Palestinian Uprising Intifada 1987-1993. At that time, the Palestinian Occupied Territories were flooded with foreign journalists, producers and camera crews. Due to the difficult political situation, the Israeli measures restricting the movement of foreign media representatives and for safety purposes especially when the Israeli undercover intelligence started using press decoys, the foreign media began to insist on being accompanied by Palestinian journalists and fixers (Kuttab, 1993). Moreover, some news agencies like Reuters (VisNews at the time) and Associated Press, started using Palestinian cameramen inside Palestinian cities, villages and Refugee Camps to capture footage of events that were hard to cover, specially when taking place in dangerous areas or at night.

Eventually, and as time passed, Palestinian cameramen, journalists and producer picked up professional television skills and thought of “how to make television economically possible in a political vital struggle” (Kuttab, 1993). Those enthusiastic professionals were encouraged then to make their own television productions (Masri, 17.11.2000).

In the last years of Israeli Occupation, the Israeli authorities started giving licenses for television transmission to few people and companies in Arab communities/cities inside Israeli. Because of the close distance between those Arab-Israeli cities and Palestinian cities in the north of the West Bank, and upon the economic success for the stations, some Palestinians in the north started to adopt the idea mainly for economic reasons (Nazzal, 20.5.2000).

The Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) was immediately established after the redeployment of the Israeli Occupation forces, and according to the agreements signed between the PLO and the Israeli Government Palestinians had “the right to build and operate separate and independent communication systems and infrastructures including telecommunications networks, a television network and a radio network” (DOP, 1993). Ever since, Palestine TV is working under the umbrella of PBC and is controlled by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), although the intention for the station was to be independent (Pick, 1997). Due to political and financial considerations, Palestine TV was put under direct control of the PNA; as a result Palestine TV is closely affiliated to the PNA and is under its direct censorship. “Palestine TV is facing major problems on different levels, mainly the transmission capacity, programming and content that do not meet with the needs of the Palestinian Public” (Masri, 17.11.2000).

The establishment of Palestine TV opened job opportunities to many Palestinian media professionals, including those who returned from outside (UNICEF, 1999). Employment at Palestine TV is administrated by a hierarchy system. Those professionals found themselves forced to leave due to professional considerations and unfair hierarchy system. After leaving, some established their own private television stations and found that, unlike working at Palestine TV, “the division of labor that differentiates management from labor, or administration from performance is kept as small as particles and accomplished by role relation, teamwork or task sharing and the diffusion of specialized knowledge through internal education” (Hochheimer 1997). People in private TV stations who occupy “leading positions in certain tasks may be required to be followers in others, thus diffusing hierarchy throughout the organization” (Hochheimer 1997).

In an attempt to find an alternative to the government controlled television station; Palestinian media professionals started thinking of establishing their own private television stations to challenge mainly the style and content of Palestine TV.

“Alternative media can be found in any context where mass media exist or are emerged” (Lewis, 1995). The political situation, and the social context allowed the establishment of such alternative TV stations. Politically, for the first time, Palestinians were able to rule themselves, establish their own governmental and non-governmental institutions. The establishment of the Palestinian Ministry of Information and the eagerness for independence and democracy, in addition to the Ministry’s belief in pluralism, competition and diversity that encouraged many Palestinian media professionals and investors to establish their own television stations (Masri, 17.11.2000).

The social context also played a role in the establishment of private television in Palestine. The diversity of political, factional and social contexts that existed in the Palestinian society during the years of Israeli Occupation, still exist under the rule of the PNA (Masri, 17.11.2000). In addition to ‘Localism’ in the Palestinian society, where local residents of an area are attached and affiliated to each other. All these elements have created special needs for the different social, political and local groups (Masri, 17.11.2000). Although, all private TV stations were originally established to service local communities, currently most of the well-established stations are able to transmit nation-wide, across the West Bank, the Gaza strip and even across borders to Jordan.

The first private television station was established in 1994 in the town of Nablus north of the West Bank. The owner of the station was a Physics student at A-Najah University in Nablus who made his own television transmitter ranging 60 square meters and was displayed in an exhibition at the University on the occasion of its 75^th anniversary (Daraghmeh, 2000). After his graduation, Ayman Al-Nimer and his colleague Saleem Sweidan established the first private television station ‘Nablus TV’. According to Al-Nimer, his station functioned for few months illegally, and “we avoided mentioning our names, but aired songs, video films, and used to re-broadcast programs picked up from Arab satellite Channels” (Daraghmeh, 2.3.2000). When the PNA did not interfere or object to the transmission, the owners were encouraged to apply for a ‘no objection’ permit and the station was officially registered (Daraghmeh, 2.3.2000).

With the success of Nablus TV, other investors and media professionals in the city and in other cities were encouraged to establish their own stations. The existence of private television stations was widely accepted and appreciated by the public, since it came as an alternative to the monopoly of the Israeli TV and Arab state-controlled TV stations. In addition, many parts of the West Bank, especially in the north were not able to pick up the transmission of Palestine TV (Pick, 1997). Moreover, Palestine TV does not represent the diversity of the Palestinian society, but even marginalize some groups such as the opposition and people with special needs (Appendix E, item 11). Private television as an alternative to the mainstream TV station “enable diverse social groups and organizations to express alternative view points” (Curran, 1996). Although Palestine TV produces programs that people want to watch, these programs still reflect the point of view of the government. Private TV stations produce programs of a different nature that are close to the needs of people. Talk shows are one example of how ordinary people are represented. Such programs “assist the realization of objectives of the society through agreement or compromise between opposed groups” (Curran 1996). (Appendix E, item 3,7 & 11).

The agenda of Palestine TV does not necessarily take into considerations the needs of the public, but is focused on its political issues related to the peace process, and mainly coverage of President Arafat’s activities. Palestine TV “broadcasts news related to the President, then news related to the officials in the PNA, and only then they remember issues that do not relate to the authority”(Pick, 1997) (Appendix E, item 13). Therefore Palestine TV is not considered a representative to public’s needs but a voice of the government. The experience of Palestine TV in this regard is not different from other experiences in the world. According to Hochheimer (1997) in Organizing Democratic Radio: Issues in Praxis “from their inception, the media of electronic communication have been structured to benefit the interest of political, military and economic power, as constituted within the control of the few” (Hochheimer 1997). Palestine TV does not allow different groups to express their viewpoints, and is never critical to the PNA. Private television stations, to a certain extend, are means to “promote the conditions in which alternative viewpoints and perspectives are brought fully into play” (Curran, 1996).

Today there are 31 private television stations in the West Bank (Appendix A) and one potential station in Gaza, that was granted a ‘temporary license’ (Masri, 17.11.2000) but still not functioning for technical reasons and due to the Israeli imposed closure on the Gaza strip that does not allow the already bought transmitter to cross the borders (Shehadah, 25.3.2001).

Private television stations in Palestine are not identical. The large number of existing television stations has shown differences between them. These differences vary from one station to another depending on the structure of the station, its policies, its legality, the professional team, equipment, and financial income.

2:1 Structures of Private Television Stations

When talking about the structure of private television stations in Palestine, one has to remember the circumstances under which these stations are working. It is obvious from the discussion in Chapter 1, that Palestinians inside Palestine have never experienced television work, but were rather consumers of television. Initiatives to establish private television stations came in response to political and social factors. Despite that, some private television stations in Palestine managed to well establish themselves, while many still strive for their existence.

Almost all private television stations started with a family enterprise or partnership. Many stations started, and some are still, working from a room in their own houses, or shops, and employ their relatives and family members (Masri, 17.11.2000). The fact that had negative effects on the work of these stations especially when it comes to professional work. The lack of professional human resources in some stations and the presence of well-trained professionals in some others is a major difference. Some small stations are run by a handful number of people who are members of the same family, including children (Nazzal, 20.5.200). Non-educated people who did not even finish their high school run other stations. While educated, trained and well-experienced staff run some stations. The gap between stations is very big and reflected in their programming. (Table 1 shows the education levels of stations managers and the number of employees).

* Number of employees may be inaccurate for taxation reason. It also includes volunteers.

Some television stations follow a clear policy of programming that includes its own production of news and programs in addition to programs re-broadcasted from Arab satellite channels, whether with legal authorization or without. Other stations do not have any policy to follow, but depend on ‘piracy’ of programs from other stations, especially Arab satellite channels (Nazzal, 20.5.2000). “Most of the television stations are primarily for entertainment (chart pie 1) purposes with the exception of Al-Quds Educational Television” (UNICEF, 1999) that broadcasts educational programs (Appendix E, item 6). Likewise, one can find other stations with similar intentions and aims of contributing to the community to achieve the national, cultural and political rights, and help build a civil society by means of empowering democracy, multiplicity and emphasis on positive social behaviors. But at the same time there are stations that are absent of all these issues (Nazzal, 20.5.2000). A number of private television stations have the capacity not only to broadcast entertaining programs but also programs of a social interest (UNICEF, 1999). Although during the first three months of Al-Aqsa Intifada (October 2000 – January 2001) political programs dominated over other programs (personal observation), currently stations are back to normal.

Chart pie 1: Programs shown by private TV in relation to its content

Source: Questionnaire

The other major structural problem is the type of equipment used in the different stations. Almost most of the stations do not have equipment that can transmit broadcast quality; however, there are few stations that use equipment of a better quality than others. While the majority of stations use VHS for recording and broadcasting, other stations use SVHS for recording but use VHS for transmitting, and others use SVHS for both recording and transmitting. Only three stations would use Beta or Digital for recording, but use SVHS for broadcasting. From (Table 2) one can see that the majority of stations use SVHS for broadcasting which is not of a broadcast quality and standard. In addition, all of the stations are located in buildings that were built for commercial use and not designed to host TV stations (Questionnaire). Moreover few stations are operating from a one-room set up in private houses, with very primitive transmission facility depending on an antenna and a modulator using home VCRs for transmission (Masri, 17.11.2000).

Financially all private television stations, except for Al-Quds Educational TV, depend on revenues coming from commercials in addition to some NGO-funded programs. The production and prices of commercials and advertisements vary from one station to another. While some stations produce commercials in good quality, others produce commercials of cheap quality. This situation has created difficulties to television stations that charge relatively expensive prices (Masri, 17.11.2000). There are no fixed prices for commercials, and some stations do not follow the standards used for commercials, for example, a commercial must not exceed the duration of 60 seconds, the total commercial time must not exceed 8 minutes per hour, the quality and clarity of the commercial, etc. (Nazzal, 20.5.2000). Such differences have eventually created problem among television stations especially in those cities where many stations are located.

Table 2: Equipment used in private TV stations

Another problem is that some stations use the policy of jamming of other stations’ transmission stations created in order to gain customers. In the city of Nablus, for example, some stations started using transmitters that would jam the transmission of other stations in an attempt to attract customers of the jammed stations. High competition between the stations and the overcrowded market of TV stations led to the fallback of the advertising market (Daraghmeh, 2.3.2000). (Table 3 shows the distribution of private TV stations in the one city in relation to the number of population).

Table 3: Distribution of TV stations in relation to the number Population

Source: Questionnaire and - Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA diary 2001)

*Jerusalem is still under total Israeli control

Another reason for the jamming is the fact that there are no free frequencies that could be used freely by the stations. This is due to the political agreements with the Israelis and the International Communication Union (ICU). The Palestinian-Israeli agreement gave Palestinians the right to use six fixed frequencies (Table 4) that were extensively used by the Palestinian TV. Currently Palestine TV is using 13 frequencies (Table 5) gained over the years through negotiations with the Israelis, but there is no official agreement on these frequencies (Abdallah, 25.1.2001). As a result, most of private TV stations use non-free and non-clean frequencies; moreover, few stations have to change the frequencies they use from time to time (Nazzal, 20.5.2000). (Table 6 shows the frequencies used by private television stations)

Source: Palestinian Ministry of Telecommunications (not published)

2:2 Legal and Regularity Framework for Private Television Stations

Media all over the world are regulated by “rules and procedures applied by governments and other political administrative authorities” (McQuail, 1995). The main objective for regulating the media is to “secure economic, legal and technical environment in which to operate” (McQuail, 1995). Regulating the media does not mean censorship, but rather setting ground rules for media organizations to work by.

Among other forms of media, and unlike print media, for example, broadcasting is “subject to a degree of special regulation beyond the general law of libel, confidentiality, obscenity, and so on” (Barendt, 1995). The different political and social systems give different justifications why radio and television should be subject to strict regulations (McQuail, 1995). Theses justifications vary between the “prevention of monopoly, the protection of differing versions of public service values, the provision of choice, in terms of product, political viewpoint and cultural diversity and the application of essentially paternalistic censorship” (Feintuck, 1999).

In a more specific justification, academic debate among scholars justifies the regulation of radio and television by four main rationales. The first is referred to airwaves being a “public resource, [therefore] the government (or some agency on its behalf) is entitled to license their use for broadcasting on the terms it sees fit” (Barendt, 1995). The second rationale is related to the use of limited frequencies. “It is impossible for everyone to acquire a license to broadcast or to enjoy access to the air his or her views on radio or television (whether public or private)” (Barendt, 1995). The third rational is because television and radio are thought to be “more influential on public than the press” (Barendt, 1995). Moreover, broadcast media are easy to enter homes and hard to control than print media. Therefore, and even in the most liberal social systems broadcast media are regulated, especially television. The fourth rationale considers broadcast media “a new means of communication and [therefore] it is understandable that the society has wanted to regulate it” (Barendt, 1995), in order to correct the shortcomings of the press.

Like any other media in the world, Palestinian media (print and broadcast) are regulated by law. The Press Law was issued in Gaza on June 25^th, 1995 by a special Presidential Decree and regulates the work of all media in Palestine and guarantees its freedom (Ministry of Information, 1995).

Article 2 Although the Palestinian Press Law doesn’t refer clearly to broadcasting, but Palestinian radio and television (both public and private) are regulated by the Press Law due to the absence of an Audio-Visual Law (Masri, 17.11.2000). A draft Audio-Visual Law was submitted to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) for discussion, but was not passed yet due to political difficulties and the absence of a Palestinian-Israeli agreement over frequencies (Masri, 17.11.2000).

Article 3 of the draft Audio-Visual Law says (unofficial translation):

On June 6^th, 1997 Palestinian President Yasser Arafat signed a Ministerial Decision that guarantees “the freedom of opinion and expression to all social and political groups” (Masri 17.11.2000) and assigned the Palestinian Minister of Information to form a Technical Coordination Committee “for the regulation of the work of private television and radio stations, and to guarantee its commitment to the rules, especially the Press Law” (Abed Rabbo, 4.6.1997). The committee was established and chaired by Yasser Abed Rabbo, Palestinian Minister of Information. Members of the committee are General Director of Publications at the Ministry of Information, representatives of the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Information, the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation (PBC), the Ministry of Telecommunication, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Trade and Economy, the Ministry of Finance, three technical experts, and a legal expert appointed by the Minister of Information (Abed Rabbo, 4.6.1997).

The Technical Coordination Committee has set the ground rules for licensing of any private television station. “Applications for a license must be submitted to the Publications Department at the Ministry of Information that offers a ‘temporary license’ and has the final say in this regard. In addition, the application must be submitted to the Ministry of Interior for security reasons and for a certificate of ‘good conduct’ of the applicant. The applicant is also requested to get the signature of the Ministry of Telecommunications, since the establishment of a television station has to do with frequencies” (Masri, 17.11.2000). If all these signatures are secured and if all conditions of capital and ownership are fulfilled, the Minister of Information signs a ‘temporary license’ allowing the opening of a television station.

In a meeting held on April 17^th, 2000 in the West Bank town of Ramallah, representatives of The Ministry of Information, representatives of private TV stations and media professionals (including myself) discussed a Temporary Draft Regulation System, and agreed on the following: (unofficial translation)

                    1- Ownership:

· The owner must be a Palestinian individual, registered company or an NGO. A company must be officially registered at the Ministry of Trade and Economy.

2- Employment

· The minimum number staff working at a television station must be 12.

· The editor in chief or manager must be a media person, or a person with minimum three-year media experience.

· The editor in chief or manager must fluently speak and write Arabic.

· The editor in chief or manager should not be managing more than one TV station.

· The editor in chief or manager must be of a good conduct.

· The editor in chief or manager must be living in Palestine.

· The editor in chief or manager must not be with immunity.

· The conditions applied to the editor in chief or manager, are also applied to the news editor.

· Every station must employ an Arabic Language expert.

· The TV station must submit a list of staff names, their contracts and tax registration to the Ministry of Information.

3- Headquarters:

· The station must be located in a well-facilitated building, and should have an isolated studio, control room, editing suite(s), archive, phone and fax lines. Any changes or renovations must be officially reported to the Ministry of Information.

4- Equipment:

· The station must use good quality equipment (SVHS as a minimum), and must guarantee the safety of individuals and environment. Equipment used must be of a quality that would not interfere with other stations’ frequencies. All transmission equipment must be registered at the Ministry of Telecommunications. Any change in equipment must be reported to the Ministry.

5- Frequencies:

· The transmission frequency must be booked through the Ministry of Telecommunications, taking into consideration not to jam or harm the transmission of other stations.

6- Programs:

· Programs must respect the humanity of individuals, the freedom of others, diversity and multiplicity. Programs must guarantee freedom of expression, objectivity, and keep public order and security requirements.

· The station must be committed to broadcast a minimum of 25% local production.

· The station must be committed to broadcast 5 hours of public service weekly.

· The station must provide the Ministry of Information with a three-month program cycle.

· Any program aired by the station must be kept for the minimum period of two weeks.

· Stations must be committed not to broadcast any material prohibited by the Press Law of 1995.

· Local production must take into consideration quality and diversity.

· Stations must provide the audience with beneficial programs that respect individual intelligence.

· The Ministry of Information encourages stations to exchange locally produced programs.

7- Broadcasting from Satellite Channels:

· It is strictly forbidden to carry live broadcast of satellite channels. It is also forbidden to re-broadcast any material taken from satellite channels without the approval of that satellite channel and the Ministry of Information. Such act would be illegal and would subject the station to legal questioning.

· All stations will be given a period of six months to settle down matters with satellite channels.

8- Capital:

· The minimum capital to start a TV station is One Hundred Thousand US Dollars ($100,000).

· A bank certificate of the capital must be submitted to the Ministry of Information.

9- Licensing:

· The Ministry of Information, and according to the Ministerial Decision of 6.6.1997, is the only ministry or government institution officially responsible for licensing, supervising, and providing services to private television stations.

· The Minister of Information has the right to grant or deny a license for new TV stations, taking into consideration the number of TV stations in the area where the new station is to be opened, the frequencies available, the market demand and the social demand.

· If the Ministry of Information finds the applicant fitting criteria set by this document and after the approval of the Ministry of Telecommunications in terms of available frequencies and the approval of the Ministry of Interior, applications for new TV stations will go through three stages:

a- The Ministry of Information gives an initial approval, under the condition that all technical requirements are ready during a period of maximum one month.

b- The new station will be given a maximum three-month period of experimental transmission.

c- If proven successful during the experimental period, the station will be granted a ‘temporary license’ for one year, renewable.

· License Fee: The annual license fee is Three Thousand Israeli Shequals, the equivalent of Seven Hundred and Thirty US Dollars ($730).

10- If a TV station does not follow the regulations, the Ministry has the right to the following:

· If the violation is the first of its kind, the station will be fined with 500 Jordan Dinars, the equivalent of Seven Hundred and Twenty US Dollars ($720).

· In case the violation is repeated, the Minister of Information has the right to stop the TV station from transmission, and report to the Attorney General and to all other related ministries.

· In the case of a third violation, the Minister of Information has the right to suspend transmission for a period of one to three months, and report to the Attorney General and to all other related ministries.

· In case of a forth violation, the Minister of Information has the right to finally close down the TV station, and report to the Attorney General and to all other related ministries.

11- Advertising:

· It is normal that advertising would be the main financial source of income for TV stations, but it is also the stations’ obligation to look after what is being advertised and guarantee that the content of the advertisements does not harm the health of individuals or violate the laws of the Ministry of Health.

· Advertisements must be professionally produced, clear and easy to understand. It also must be produced in a way to be distinguished from other programs.

· Advertisements are allowed to be aired in between programs and during programs, under the condition of keeping the unity of the program, and in a way that would not violate copyrights and intellectual property.

· A station must not exceed eight minutes of advertising per hour.

12- Foreign Aid and Assistance:

· A TV station must depend financially on legal sources that are publicly known. It is strictly forbidden to get any foreign aid, financial support or direction.

· Any station willing to get any non-governmental foreign aid or assistance must apply to the Ministry of Information, before receiving it.

13- All station will be given the period of three months (May, June and July 2000) to implement the above mentioned regulations. By the end of this period, the Minister of Information has the right to close down any station that does not fit the criteria.

Unfortunately, these regulations are widely being violated by different stations. The eruption of Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 prevented the Ministry of Information from taking any legal steps to shut down stations violating the regulations (Masri, 17.11.2000). Violations are mostly evident in the fields related to employment, headquarters, equipment, programs, advertising and broadcasting from satellite.

In the field of employment, (table 1) shows that there are station that employ less than 12 people. As for an Arabic language expert, the majority of the stations do not employ one (Questionnaire). According to Hani Masri, Director General of the Publication department at the Ministry of Information not all stations have submitted a list of employees to the Ministry.

As for headquarters and equipment, the questionnaire shows that not all stations have the proper set up as requested by the Ministry. Moreover, (table 2) shows that out of 31 TV stations, 14 stations use VHS equipment, which is a clear violation to the regulations.

In terms of programs, it is true that all stations are committed to the 25% of local production, but the understanding of local production is not clear to many stations. Most of the stations consider live talk shows, for example, local production. While others mean by local production, well prepared children programs, documentaries, drama, etc. (Masri, 17.11.2000). (Chart pie 2) shows that the 50% of programs aired by TV stations are talk shows (25% recorded and 25% live) and (Chart pie 3) shows the percentage of local production.

One of the major problems the Ministry is facing is the issue of satellite piracy. 50% of programs shown by private TV stations are taken from Arab Satellite channels (Chart pie 3). Only few channels have official agreements with satellite channels to re-broadcast some of their programs (Daraghmeh, 2.3.2000).

Chart pie 2: Programs shown by private TV in relation to style

Source: Questionnaire

Advertising, as shown by (Chart pie 4) is the main source of income for TV stations, except for Al-Quds Educational Television that is a non-prophet organization financed by donations and aid from Palestinian local NGOs, and International organizations like USAID, UNDP, UNICEF, Ford Foundation and others (Kuttab, 30.1.2001). The dependency of private TV stations on advertising has created problems among stations, especially when it comes to quality, price and timing (Nazzal, 20.5.2000)

Chart pie 4: Source of income for private TV stations

Source: Questionnaire

TV stations, on one hand, are violating the regulations set by the Ministry of Information and approved by the majority of the stations. On the other hand, the Ministry of Information did not set a good example of commitment and has itself violated the regulations, especially in regard to point 9 of the earlier mentioned regulations that says clearly that “the Ministry of Information, and according to the Ministerial Decision of 6.6.1997, is the only ministry or government institution officially responsible for licensing, supervising, and providing services to private television stations”. The Ministry of Information actually is not the only ministry or government institution that is supervising private television stations, but the different Palestinian Security forces are taking the responsibility of supervising and even censoring private TV in Palestine.

3:3 The Palestinian National Authority and Private Television Stations

The relationship between private television stations and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) over the past seven years has taken the shape of two forms. On the one hand, the PNA allowed private television stations to exists for three main reasons “first, it wanted to set facts on the ground in terms of occupying as much television frequencies as possible. Second, was the fear that Israel, may at some point, close down or attack the government owned Palestinian TV and third is because people at the Ministry of Information, especially the Minister who believes in freedom of expression” (Kuttab, 30.1.2001). On the other hand the PNA has tried on different occasions to suppress these stations by closing down a number of them for different periods of time and by arresting owners or journalists working at these stations for mainly political reasons. PNA actions against private television in Palestine have widely been condemned by Palestinian and International human rights organizations, and even by people within the PNA.

Not all Palestinian officials of the PNA share the same point of views regarding private television stations. “Officials like governors, mayors, PLC members, many ministers and the Ministry of Information have worked actively to prevent any action taken by the PNA against private television stations, and are actually maintaining good relations with these stations because they want their voices to be heard by the local community. Television stations are one of the best means available to make this come true. The major problem is with the security apparatus and the Ministry of Interior” (Kuttab, 30.1.2001), in addition to the opposition of the PBC to the existence of private TV stations which was publicly announced by the chairman of the PBC, when he demanded the PNA to shut down these stations (Masri, 17.11.2000).

All Palestinian official statement and laws state that the freedom of expression is guaranteed. The Palestinian Declaration of Independence of November 15^th, 1988 sates that:

This commitment to the freedom of expression was “embodied in all [draft] versions of the Palestinian Basic Law, article 27” (UNICEF, 1999) that states (unofficial translation):

The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) passed the Palestinian Basic Law, but still is not ratified by the Palestinian President (Amnesty, 2000).

Private television stations in Palestine work under the umbrella of the Palestinian Press Law of 1995, already discussed in the second section of this chapter. According to Palestinian and International human rights organizations this law “gives the PNA very wide powers to regulate the media by prohibiting a whole range of information, including any information of which may harm national unity” (Amnesty, 2000).

Article 7 of the Press Law prohibits the publication or transmission of “any material that may contradict the principles of freedom, national responsibilities, human rights and the respects of truth” (Ministry of Information, 1995). Concepts like ‘national responsibility’; ‘national unity’ and the ‘respect of truth’ are general and vague, and therefore could be interpreted in different ways (Al-Fased, 1999). The Press Law also restricts the “publication of confidential information about police, security forces, secret documents of the Palestinian National Council, the Cabinet, minutes of court hearings before a final court decision is taken and information that may humiliate religions or shakes confidence in the national currency” (Al-Fased, 1999). Such broad, general and vague provisions are open to abuse by the different security forces of the PNA.

In addition to the legal framework, political agreements between the PNA and Israel have forced the PNA to take actions against private television stations. Article 22 of The Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West bank and The Gaza Strip says, “Israel and the [Palestinian] Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction” (JMCC, 1996).

The Wye River Memorandum, signed between the PNA and the Israeli Government in Washington on October 23, 1998 clearly talks about measure to be taken to prevent incitement “drawing on relevant international practice and pursuant to Article XXII (1) of the Interim Agreement and the Note for the Record, the Palestinian side will issue a decree prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror. This decree will be comparable to the existing Israeli legislation which deals with the same subject” (JMCC, 1998). The same memorandum describes how monitory must be done “a U.S.- Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet on a regular basis to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement. The Israeli, Palestinian and U.S. sides will each appoint a media specialist, a law enforcement representative, an educational specialist and a current or former elected official to the committee” (JMCC, 1998).

As a result, and in commitment to the agreements signed with the Israeli Government, the PNA in November 1998 issued the Presidential Decree No. 3 Concerning the Strengthening of National Unity and the Prohibition of Incitement that “goes far beyond prohibiting all forms of incitement to violence or terror and punishes a broad range of speech including forms of expressions protected under international human rights law” (Amnesty, 2000).

In light of these legal and political considerations, the relationship between the PNA and private television stations during the past seven years was not of its best form. But at the same time, there is no doubt that without the help of the PNA, these stations would have not existed. Although, PNA violations to the freedom of expression and actions taken against these stations are worrying.

According to Palestinian and International human rights organizations including the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen’s Rights (PICCR), the International Press Institute (IPI) and Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) the relationship between private television stations and the PNA did not improve over the past three years. Closure of private television stations and the arrests of owners and journalists working at these stations were mainly for political reasons and during critical political situations, although there were few incidents when some stations were closed for religious reasons. On April 26^th, 1999, for example, Palestinian security forces ordered Al-Amal TV station in Hebron to “closed for nearly three weeks after it broadcast a controversial program on Islam” (IPI, 2000). In a similar incident Shepherds (Al-Roa’) TV in Bethlehem was closed down on May 17^th, 1999 by the PNA for showing a play “allegedly inciting communal strife in its broadcast of containing religious themes” (CPJ, 2000). The play according to officials in the Ministry of Interior “planted sedition between the Moslems and Christians in the town where Jesus was born” (IPI, 2000). The closure of Shepherds (Al-Roa’) TV was not the first of its kind, although different reasons were given. “On February 16, 1998, more than a 100 policemen forced the station off the air after it broadcast coverage of pro-Iraqi demonstration in the West Bank … the station remained banned for nearly five months until authorities allowed it to resume broadcasting in July 1999” (CPJ, 2000). (Appendix E, item 1).

(Table 7 lists all documented actions taken against private TV stations)

 

Date	Station / Name of person	Action	Alleged Reasons
20.5.1997	Al-Quds Educational TV- Ramallah Daoud Kuttab	Jammed Arrested for 8 days	Security
25.9.1997	Afaq TV- Nablus Issa Abu Al-Iz	Closed Arrested	Security
16.2.1998	Shepherds (Al-Roa’) - Bethlehem	Closed	Security
21.2.1998	Seven journalists working at Shepherds (Al-Roa’) - Bethlehem	Arrested	Security and in relation to crisis in Iraq
Feb. 1998	Al-Mahd TV – Bethlehem	Closed	Security and in relation to crisis in Iraq
Feb. 1998	Bethlehem TV - Bethlehem	Closed	Security and in relation to crisis in Iraq
Feb. 1998	Wattan TV - Ramallah	Closed	Security and in relation to crisis in Iraq
Feb. 1998	An-Naser TV- Ramallah	Closed	Security and in relation to crisis in Iraq
18.2.1998	All private TV and Radio stations	Signed a pledge to refrain from broadcasting material related to Iraq	Security and in relation to crisis in Iraq
26.4.1999	Amal TV –Hebron	Closed	Religious
17.5.1999	Shepherds (Al-Roa’) - Bethlehem	Closed	Religious
15.9.1999	Al-Quds Educational TV and An-Naser TV - Ramallah Maher Al-Dasouki	Censored Arrested for 19 days	Denouncing Palestinian President and dangerous security reasons
21.5.2000	Wattan TV – Ramallah	Closed	For protesting against the closure of An-Naser TV
27.5.2000	Maher Al-Dassouki Ayman Bardaweel Walid Batrawi	Held at Police station	Criticizing the closure of TV stations
30.5.2000	An-Naser TV – Ramallah	Closed	Security
1.6.2000	Al-Mahd TV – Bethlehem   Sameer Qumsieh	Closed   Arrested for 3 days	For protesting against the closure of An-Naser TV His letter to Palestinian President requesting the opening of An-Naser TV

Source: compiled from Amnesty (2000), Campagna (2.10.2000), CPJ (1998), CPJ (2000), CPJ (2001), IPI (2000) and PICCR (2001).

Although all cases in (Table 7) are important, one can find few interesting to detail. One widely reported is the case of Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab of Al-Quds Educational Television who was detained on May 20^th, 1997 following “the publication of an article in the International Herald Tribune and The Washington Post in which he described efforts of Palestine TV to jam his live coverage of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)” (CPJ, 1998). (Appendix E, item 1). Kuttab was detained for eight days at a police station in Ramallah without charge and was only released after “CPJ spearheaded a seven-day international campaign, including appeals to Yasser Arafat and the US government” (CPJ, 1998).

“In one prominent case, [Palestinian] security agents detained talk show host Maher Al-Dassouki for 19 days. Although the PNA did not explain his detention it was thought to have been triggered by a live interview in which a mother of a [Palestinian] prisoner in Israel denounced President Arafat” (CPJ, 2000). (Appendix E, item 7). After his release Al-Dassouki described in his own show how he was tortured by the Palestinian security forces (Appendix E, item 8). Since then, security forces watch Al-Dassouki’s ‘Space for Opinion’ talk show on a regular basis.

The year 2000 was not better for private television. During research for this study many television stations were closed and harassed. On February 15, 2000, Palestinian police closed down A-Nawras TV in Hebron. According to the TV manager “criminal police came to the station and asked the staff to close down the station without a written order” (PICCR, 2001). Later, the manager was told that the closure was for showing a program that discussed teachers’ strike (PICCR, 2001). The station was “allowed to resume broadcasting on March 3^rd, 2000, after appeals to the PNA officials and member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)” (CPJ, 2001).

On May 21st, 2000, Palestinian Criminal police ordered the closure of Wattan TV in Ramallah. The manager of the station was called in and was asked to immediately phone the station and stop transmission. It is believed that the closure order came as a result of the station’s intensive coverage of activities in solidarity with political prisoners in Israeli jails (PICCR, 2001). On May 23^rd, the “Palestinian Ministry of Information notified Omar Nazzal, director of the station, that Wattan TV can resume broadcasting. But when the station employees attempted to return to work, armed police officers raided the station and evacuated the premises. Nazzal was detained for an hour and accused of disregarding the police’s closure order. When Nazzal explained that the Ministry of Information had given him permission to broadcast the police said that they did not recognize the Ministry’s authority” (CPJ, 2001). The station resumed broadcasting on May 24, 2000.

On May 27, 2000, I [Walid Batrawi] phoned Maher Al-Dassouki’s ‘Space for Opinion’ talk show, complaining about the closure of TV stations by the Palestinian Criminal Police saying: “I would like to understand who is responsible for the closure of TV stations, and why the Criminal Police is doing it, they should be dealing with crime and not close down TV stations”. (Appendix E, item 14). Immediately, and as I hung up the phone, an officer from the Criminal Police called me at home and asked me to visit him for a ‘cup of coffee’. I met a high level Colonel who said to me “you seem to know what to say, but you have done a big mistake when you mentioned our police in particular”. An armed civilian led me to another room where I had the coffee. Half an hour later, Al-Dassouki and Ayman Bardaweel manager of Al-Quds Educational TV accompanied by PLC Member Abdel Fattah Hamael, who was a guest on the show, arrived at the police station. Bardaweel was put in a room; Al-Dassouki and Hamael met the Colonel. “The Colonel had files and information about what Al-Dassouki said on several occasions. The Colonel told Al-Dassouki that Sundays and Wednesdays are his special nights, and that he was specialized in Al-Dassouki” (Campagna 2.10.2000). Three hours later, we all left the station, but before leaving the Colonel told me “I hope by now you know who we are, this time it was a quick cup of coffee, who knows what will happen in the next time”.

On May 30, 2000, the Ramallah based A-Naser TV and its sister radio station Al-Manara in was ordered to close. Criminal police “visited both offices, which are housed in the same building and announced that the two stations were being closed. No reason was given, but staff members suggested that it might have stemmed from A-Naser TV’s airing a call-in-talk show during which members of the PLC criticized the PNA. One legislator said on the air that a new Palestinian leadership might be necessary if progress was not made on the issue of Palestinian statehood by September” (CPJ, 2001). On June 31, “PNA authorities informed Ammar Ammar, director of both stations, that Al-Manara radio station could resume broadcasting, but the ban on A-Naser TV station remained in effect. A-Naser was allowed to reopen in late June” (CPJ, 2001).

On June 1^st, 2000, Mahd station in Bethlehem was sealed with red wax and Sameer Qumsiyeh, station manager was arrested for three days with no written order. Qumsiyeh, who is also chairman of the Union of Private TV and Radio Stations, was arrested for calling on stations to suspend their transmission for half an hour in solidarity with other closed down stations (PICCR, 2001).

Later in the year, on November 15^th, 2000, “security forces raided the private Bethlehem television station Al-Roa’ (Shepherds) and temporarily forced it off the air. Security agents beat up station director Hamdi Farraj and several other staff members, threatening to shoot them and destroy the station’s equipment. The attack was apparently promoted by the station’s erroneous report that the Israeli forces had bombed a Palestinian military post in Bethlehem” (CPJ, 2001) Two days later “on November 17^th, 2000 Palestinian police ordered the station to cease broadcasting. The police carried a letter to PNA President Yasser Arafat, asking him to order the closure of Al-Roa’ and the arrest of Farraj, whom the letter accused of promoting sectarian strife” (CPJ, 2001). Farraj was not arrested, but the station was closed until November 19^th after residents of Bethlehem “marched to the station’s offices and demanded that it reopen” (CPJ, 2001).

PNA harassments to private television stations are becoming a form of ‘post censorship’ that the PNA is practicing is to avoid being criticized of imposing ‘pre-censorship’. The policy of post censorship has led private television stations to set their own self-censorship or ‘pre-censorship’ for programs that may include controversial taboo topics, political criticism or corruption related topics (Masri, 17.11.2000). “Palestinian journalists know that the PNA is watching them” (Campagna 2.10.2000). Governments that are not interested in direct control and censorship “rely on a system of post censorship using means from socialization, harassment, economic sanctions, the revocation of licenses, jail terms against journalists to extreme torture and murder” (O’Neil, 1998).

The relationship between the PNA and private television stations may not be bright, but as a matter of fact, the PNA is one of the few governments in the Arab World that would allow private television (Mowlana, 1995) and would allow people to freely express their opinions to a certain extend. “Hosting PNA officials and allowing opposition groups to express their opinions and not necessarily harass the host stations is a matter that the PNA must be credited for” (Nazzal 20.5.2000).

Throughout the years of occupation, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have been subjected to different types of media that were not produced by Palestinians themselves as discussed in Chapter 1, although they used to get, secretly, publications and films produced in exile by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (Marashli, 1986).

After the establishment of the PNA, and the existence of Palestinian owned media outlets, the chance for political and intellectual production inside Palestine was more possible. The existence of a national TV and 31 private television stations, has for sure contributed to the Palestinian national and cultural identities, especially because Palestinians are now in a process of a nation-building.

Media is known to be an important means of communications between nations across the World and between different groups of the same nation in one country. Television is a very strong media tool that can help shape nations’ political and cultural identities.

Private televisions stations in Palestine, and since the first TV station was established, are actively working on strengthening the Palestinian national identity. The promotion of ‘common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the population together in their homeland” (Das, 1995) is top priority on its agenda. Programs shown by private television stations, mainly political talk shows help to educate the public about their national identity, especially when there is a new generation in the Palestinian society that would not necessarily know the years of Palestinian national formation. On different national occasions, private television stations open the sphere for different political groups to express their point of views and show documentaries related to the occasion. On several occasions, stations try to link between Palestinians in exile and those inside Palestine through phone calls, which help the public to form a public opinion about debated issues, not only depending on the point of view of politicians inside Palestine, but also those in exile. This education of national rights and identity to new generations help “maintain a sense of national belonging” (Das, 1995). Private television coverage of national events, activities and news strengthens the “we-feeling, a feeling of family among the community, providing continual opportunities for identification with the nation through invitations to be present at ‘national’ ceremonies and rituals, ensuring that ever larger audience can be ever more intimately present” (Das, 1995).

During the past seven months of Al-Aqsa Intifada, private television stations have played a very active political role being a local source of information to political developments and news. One Palestinian journalist described the role of private television stations by saying: “after getting news about clashes between Israeli police and civilians in the Nazareth, and the killing of demonstrators, political parties in the city of Ramallah decided to call the public for a demonstrations in solidarity with the people of Nazareth. The only easy way to do so, was to call private television stations and make the announcement” (Iz Al-Deen, 26.10.2000). Private television stations started to play an alternative role for satellite channels “even foreign and Arab reporters based in Palestine made sure to watch private TV stations, because these stations send reporters and cameramen to cover clashes and report the latest news” (Iz Al-Deen, 26.10.2000). Private television stations gave “up-to-date information for local communities at a time when people in the past were absolutely in dark, because there is absolutely no other way of informing people, there is no siren system, people relied totally on TV stations” (Kuttab, 29.11.2000).

In addition to the national identity, the cultural identity is an important item on the stations’ agendas. Although, and for a period of four months (October 2000 – February 2001), “private television stations suspended their cultural and entertaining programs to be devoted to the coverage of Al-Aqsa Intifada” (Iz Al-Deen, 26.10.2000).

‘Culture’ is defined by three meanings, “one of a general process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development (culture as ‘civilization’); one of the works and practices of intellectual and artistic activity ‘high culture’ and one of a particular way of life whether of people, a period of time or a group” (Davis-Yuval, 1997). The Palestinian cultural experience, whether ‘high’ or ‘popular’, is of a significant identity, since it deals with national and political issues and therefore is called ‘culture of resistance’. The political circumstances under which Palestinians live play a role in forming the ‘culture of resistance’.

As part of entertainment programs, local production and political agenda, private television stations tend to broadcast cultural programs, and material related to the ‘culture of resistance’. This in fact, contributes not only to the Palestinian popular cultural experience, but also to the ‘high culture’. Showing the inherited culture through programs of folklore, arts, literature, music and other. The production of programs challenging traditional thinking and the coverage of cultural activities are forms of enhancing the ‘popular culture’ and introducing local community to their cultural identity. On the other hand, and as part of introducing people to the ‘high culture’, private television stations intend always to produce and show programs hosting journalists, writers, artists, poets, singers, documentary and drama directors and others. The combination of ‘popular’ and ‘high’ culture helps to bridge the gap between the elitists and the ‘man on the street’. The policy of private television stations is also of its own interest to increase “access to communities from different localities, ethnicities, and cultural backgrounds so as to produce ever-large popular audience” (During, 1995). Stations, therefore, gain more viewership and would succeed to convince companies and business outlets to advertise. Moreover, With almost every Palestinian house possessing a TV set (UNICEF, 1999) and an antenna to pick up the transmission of private television stations available in the area, watching private television stations is becoming a daily practice. The popularity of TV stations, and the tradition of watching these stations on a daily basis, has turned private television to become part the Palestinian ‘popular culture’. The popularity of private television comes from what these stations have to offer to their audiences and different groups in the Palestinian society.

The existence of 31 private television stations in Palestine creates, on one hand, an atmosphere of competition, diversity and creativity that is positively valued. On the other hand, there is a high degree of criticism related to the professional level of these stations.

“Since transmission is relatively easy from a technical point of view, and cheap from a financial prospect, many people were able to buy transmitters and start transmitting signals to the public with no professional considerations, the fact that lowered the professional level of some stations. Most of the stations, even those considered of a high level, are using equipment that is not of a broadcast quality” (Nazzal, 20.5.2000).

Professionalism is one of the major problems private television stations are facing. “Not all stations have qualified staff, many have employed camera people who used to film weddings and other social events, or people who used to sell and fix TV sets and electronics. Those people were not rehabilitated or trained to do professional television work, although many of them may have the skill to do so” (Masri, 17.11.2000).

The lack of professionalism is mainly due to financial problems. The nature of private television stations, being independent, receiving no money from the government and depending mainly on advertising or TV sponsorship (Kuttab, 29.11.2000) are reasons for financial difficulties. In addition “investors are not putting their money in this sector because these stations are ‘temporary licensed’ due to the absence of an audio-visual law” (Masri, 17.11.2000) they can’t risk their money in an unstable market.

Lack of money is an obstacle to development. Stations can neither train their staff nor buy new equipment. Therefore, the professional level will not improve dramatically. There are local training courses, lectures, and university programs for journalists, but most of television staff members are not able to join these training because they have a job to do and because of the lack of money.

Low professionalism was clear during the past seven months of Al-Aqsa Intifada, when stations had to deal with news coverage. Stations wanted to help “community service by giving information through communicating with the people and between government and the people” (Kuttab, 30.1.2000). “Although private television stations have a positive role in covering events of the Intifada, one has to admit that stations do unforgivable mistakes, like the accuracy of news. It is true that competition and the speed coverage of news are essential, but news must be accurate. Many television stations would put on their screens ‘breaking news’ that are not accurate” (Masri, 17.11.2000).

“The shelling of the Red Crescent headquarters, Israeli troops re-occupying Palestinian cities, and thirty martyrs in Gaza in one day” are examples of breaking news that private stations would write in captions on their screens that are not true. (Iz Al-Deen, 26.10.2000) The lack of financial recourses made stations depend on phone calls from the public and broadcast the news without even checking if true or not (Iz Al-Deen, 26.10.2000). Money may be one reason for not being able to get correspondents to all locations, but the “ability to double check any phone call is a professional issue. One of the basic journalistic skills is to be able to get the accurate information before giving it to the people. There were cases when private television stations and Palestine TV announced names of martyrs who did not die and even not injured” (Masri, 17.11.2000).

Moreover, there is “not enough responsibility in the way pictures were chosen and many scenes should never have been broadcast during hours that children are awake and without warning. Some of the stations might have contributed consciously or not to inciting the public” (Kuttab, 30.1.2001). (Appendix E, item 12).

As a result, public calls were made to the Ministry of Information, owners and staff of private television stations demanding professional coverage of the events. In a letter to private television stations the Union of Palestinian Journalists “demanded the accurate coverage of news” (Al-Quds, 4.11.2000). On November 17, 2000 residents of Nablus area called upon private television stations to “stop broadcasting bloody horrible pictures taken inside hospital emergency rooms for people injured in clashes, or pictures of martyrs’ blown up heads” (Al-Quds, 18.11.2000).

The eruption of Al-Aqsa Intifada on September 29, 2000, had delayed the decision of the Ministry of Information to close down those stations not fitting professional criteria set by the Ministry. This delay is because the Ministry does not want people to think that the closure is due to political reasons or a “suppression of the freedom of expression. In the past when the Ministry closed down eight television stations for professional considerations, it was accused by human right organizations of suppressing freedom of expression” (Masri, 17.11.2000).

Solutions to the professional problems of private television in Palestine may not be at ease. Suggestions to improve the professional level of these stations vary from training, finding more financial recourses other than advertising, to the merge of small weak stations with the bigger strong ones (Nazzal 20.5.2000).

As part of the search for training and financial aid, a group of six private television stations and one Television Company in Gaza formed a coalition called ‘Shams’ (Sun) an Arabic abbreviation of ‘Palestinian Network of Independent Stations’. (Appendix E, item 9).

‘Shams’ is part of a Danish funded project, aimed at developing private television in Palestine. The Danish government was encouraged to sponsor the network after realizing that “a handful of stations on the West Bank now obtained strong enough transmission facilities, and around 70% of the Palestinian population have access to them. At the same time the recording equipment and studios are lacking in quality and often badly in need of maintenance, in addition training is definitely needed” (Batrawi and Jessen 3.4.2000).

In terms of training, some stations have had different opportunities for training that required stations to send key persons abroad for several months and as “stations can rarely spare the best employees for such a period of time, training was most often reported to be received by less motivated and less promising employees” (Batrawi and Jessen 3.4.2000).

In an attempt to seek financial aid, Palestinian private television stations appealed on November 25, 2000 to the International community for help. In the appeal, private stations explained their needs “as private non-governmental stations, we depend solely on advertisement and program sponsorship. While we normally prefer to be self reliant, depending on advertisement income for our survival, the present situation [Al-Aqsa Intifada] is threatening our very existence as truly democratic and independent voices in Palestine. We are therefore sending out this emergency appeal for help with the hope it will find listening ears. Our needs can be summarized as follows: direct financial support to cover the salaries of our staff or to sponsor programs and spots, support in replacing our equipment (Super VHS or Digital Cameras and editing equipment), video tapes and protective gear for our camera persons (helmets and bulletproof vests). Your support is crucial to keep this free and democratic voice alive in Palestine”.

The development of training programs and seeking financial supports, are therefore, two main objectives that private television stations aim to achieve in order to raise its professional level. In addition, stations need an effective unifying union, a constructive regulating law and an implementation for the Temporary Draft Regulation System set by the Ministry of Information and the TV stations (Nazzal, 20.5.2000).

It is doubtless to say that the experience of private television stations in Palestine, although still immature, is a unique one and is a real effort for building a democratic state, despite all political, economic and social difficulties. Private television stations are part of the general Palestinian situation that is still unclear and instable.

Seven years ago, the idea of private television stations was a dream for many Palestinians; now the dream has come true, faced with challenge and continuous work. Private television stations worked hard to strengthen the basic democratic right for the freedom of expression, challenged by an immature democratic experience, a society that is still tied up to its religious and traditional customs and faced by financial and professional difficulties.

The existence of private television stations in Palestine is becoming a fact that would not be easy to change; therefore, it is the responsibility of these stations, in the first place, to maintain its survival, also the responsibility of the society and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Real efforts must be made to overcome all difficulties; especially those related to the stations themselves, society and the PNA.

The establishment of private television stations came during a very critical political, social and economic situation that is reflected in the way these stations function. Although without a peace process these stations would have not existed, the instable political situation and difficulties facing Palestinians in regards to the peace process and the implementation of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements have played a negative role to the development of private television in Palatine. The lack of a Palestinian-Israeli agreement over frequencies led to the inability of the PNA to pass an Audio-Visual Law that regulates the work of these stations, instead regulation is dependent on the Press Law that is more applicable to print media and on regulations made in a form of orders and memos of understanding. Political agreements between the PNA and the Israeli Government regarding incitement are also an obstacle to the freedom of expression. Palestinian media outlets and specially television, whether private or governmental, are always accused by the Israelis of inciting ‘terror’, and therefore the PNA is demanded to close down those stations that incite the public. Under this excuse, Palestinian security forces, took the advantage to shut down many stations for allegedly inciting against the ‘supreme national interest’. Socially, private television stations face many restrictions. The Palestinian society is tied up to its religious (Moslem and Christian) roots and to its social traditions. Television stations try to satisfy all social and religious groups at the expense of being free and democratic. Therefore, private television stations are very sensitive to debate controversial taboo topics. As a result of the political, social and religious restrictions, all stations are subjected political, social and self-censorship. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, television stations tend to involve as much political, social and religious groups in its programs in order to be objective, accurate and balanced. The major common difficulties between all stations are professional and financial. These two problems are a result of each other. The lack of financial resources and the low investment in this sector as a result of the non-clear future of these stations, are being reflected in the professional practice of private television stations. Many people with professional television skills are attracted to work with well-paying televisions stations like foreign and Arab television crews based in Palestine or Israel. Volunteers and part-time professionals who believe in contributing to private television, and who are not looking for money, are involved in work at some well-established stations. Due to low professionalism of some stations, investors, advertisers and donors are not willing to put money in projects and programs proven non-professional. In order to overcome the political, social, legal, professional and financial difficulties, work must be done on all levels. Politically, it is uneasy to change agreements with the Israeli government and would not be easy to start negotiating on the use of frequencies when major problems like the future of Jerusalem and the return of Palestinian refugees are not solved through negotiations. Therefore, the PNA must work on the internal political situation and its relationship with private television stations. The PNA must give stations a free hand in programming, the selection of topics and guests, allow more freedom of speech and accept criticism. This can be only guaranteed by securing fair professional regulations and laws in favor of stations’ development and not for the purpose of censorship. If such regulations and laws are implemented, violations of Palestinian security forces and social restrictions affecting the work of private television stations can then be fought against easily, and will strengthen stations to “enable their development as independents democratic voices in the Palestinian society and to enhance the respect of human rights for the value of democratic change” (Batrawi and Jessen 3.4.2000). Professionally “a new round of on-the-job training directly at private television stations is recommended. Trainings must be planned directly with training institutions in the field of journalistic development, programming, production and production planning, maintenance of equipment and development of locally produced advertising. By including the latter, stations can improve their commercial status and thus the sustainability of a permanent financial recourse” (Batrawi and Jessen, 3.4.2000). Networking among stations and the merge of small stations with big ones must also be considered. Networking will strengthen the “democratic role of private television stations by giving their viewers access to more and better programs as well as programs from other areas of Palestine” (Batrawi and Jessen, 3.4.2000). The merge between small and big stations will come eventually, because the market will only allow those strong well-established stations to exists, therefore, instead of closing down small stations, it is recommended that these stations merge with bigger ones for the benefit of the stations themselves and the public (Daraghmeh, 2.3.2000).If the above-mentioned steps are taken into consideration, I expect that private television stations in Palestine will have a bright promising future. Until then, one has to watch how the future of these stations will develop.

Information Update

1- On October 11, 2000 the Israeli army used helicopter missiles to destroy the Palestinian TV transmission dishes and the radio transmission tower. The Israeli bombardment came following the killing of two IDF soldiers in Ramallah on the same day. Later in the year, the Israeli army destroyed the 70-year old antenna of the Palestinian Radio. On January 19, 2002 Israeli army bombarded the building of the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation; as a result private television stations cooperated with Palestine TV to carry the transmission. In chapter 2 as one of the reasons why the PNA allowed private television in Palestine “first, it wanted to set facts on the ground in terms of occupying as much television frequencies as possible. Second, was the fear that Israel, may at some point, close down or attack the government owned Palestinian TV and third is because people at the Ministry of Information, especially the Minister who believes in freedom of expression” (Kuttab, 30.1.2001).

2- In March and April 2002 the Israeli army re-occupied all Palestinian controlled cities and occupied the headquarters of several private TV stations damaging the premises and equipment. Among the station occupied were Al-Quds Educational Television, Watan TV, Al-Naser TV, Amwaj TV, Al-Istiqlal TV (all in Ramallah). Other TV stations all over the West Bank were attacked. Ever since, Amwaj TV was mostly occupied by Israeli army since it is located in a building that overlooks Yasser Arafat’s compound. In all TV stations the damage was huge.

http://www.geocities.com/wramallah/sledgehammer_treatment_for_pales.htm

3- On May 27, 2002 Palestinian President Yasser Arafat ratified the Palestinian Basic law that guarantees freedom of the media in article 27 “Freedom of audio and visual mass media, printing, distribution and transmission, including freedom of employees working in them are guaranteed according to this basic law and other related laws; … censorship of the [media] is prohibited and no [media organization] shall be subject to warning, suspension or termination or the imposition of restrictions, except in accordance with the law and judicial order”.

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